

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7 January 1958

MEMO FOR Colonel Lansdale

Mr. [] called me this date, stating that there would be an IAC meeting Director's Conference Room Admin Bldg, CIA, at 1045 on Tuesday, 21 Jan. to which this office is invited to send representation.

The purpose of this IAC meeting is to have what it is hoped will be a final discussion of the entire package of the NSCIDs.

Stewart

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

TOP SECRETFILE
25 Feb 58

NSCID No. 5 clearly establishes the primary responsibility of CIA for the conduct of U.S. espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad, while at the same time providing the necessary authority for the armed services to engage in such activities in support of their own requirements. Service participation in clandestine activities has long been recognized and welcomed by CIA. It was provided for in the original NSCID-5 by the somewhat vague term "agreed activities," which it was then necessary to define and expand in [] which served as a corollary to the original NSCID 5. To the extent that the new NSC directive combines the provisions of the earlier NSCD-5 [] with respect to Service espionage and counter-espionage activities, it should be viewed as neither ^{an} undesirable diffusion of responsibility" or a retreat from the earlier version.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Date	23 DEC 1986
Declassify on	OADR
Reviewed by	REC MGT DIV. WES
Reason:	DOD 5200.1R, Para 202 <i>dse</i>

No OSD objection to
declassification

subject to CIA

concurrence.

TOP SECRET

TS-1146

[Signature]

**TOP SECRET****OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.***F.I.L.O.*
NSCIDs

8 January 1958


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

This office was not notified in any way by CIA of the specific time of the IAC meeting on 7 January, but was under the impression that it was to be held at 2:30 that date. Preparations were made to have OSO representation at this IAC meeting on NSCIDs 5, 13 and 14. In the case of NSCID 5, the only one of the three NSCIDs concerning which this office had any real change proposals to make, the undersigned had prepared some proposed changes, concurred in by all members of the OSO office (see attached comments on NSCID 5).

It was discovered around noon of the 7th that the IAC meeting had actually been held at 1045. A check with the Office of General Truscott, the CIA IAC Secretariat, and with [] CIA coordinator for these NSCIDs, that this office had not been notified in any way of the time, and [] had had this responsibility.

[] apologized for his failure to notify this office of the time of the IAC meeting and agreed, after discussion with General Truscott, to include, based on the desire of DOD, the change proposed by this office in paragraph 2d contained in the attached OSO comments on revised draft of NSCID 5. Other proposed changes are, admittedly, not of sufficient importance to require IAC discussion.

The next IAC meeting, on 21 January, will include NSCID 5 and all the NSCIDs in final discussion as a "package."


MATTHEW C. STEWART
Colonel, USANo OSO objection to
declassificationsubject to CIA

concurrence.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)**TOP SECRET***TS-1145**EF*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6 November 1957

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

I telephoned [] CIA, re: results of the 5 November 1957 meeting of the IAC on NSCID 5 at which Mr. William Smith, OSO, was present and where certain members agreed to submit further position papers. [] said he gathered that Army (General Schow) and JIG (General Collins) were the only ones to submit such papers and that he would send these new views, as well as CIA's comments on them, to OSO for our own office coordination and comments prior to making any changes in a new draft of NSCID 5 for action by the IAC.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)

MS7
MATTHEW C. STEWART
Colonel, USA

C-30214

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

25 October 1957

MEMO FOR Colonel Lansdale

[redacted] CIA, telephoned me this morning and said that General Truscott wanted Colonels Lansdale and Stewart both to try to be present at the IAC meeting next Tuesday, 29 October (IAC conference room, first floor, CIA Administration Building) at 1045, when NSCID 5 is scheduled to be an early item on the agenda.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Objective is to arrive at tentative approval by the IAC on NSCID 5. After all NSCIDs have been approved and fully coordinated with each other by the IAC, then it is planned to ship all of these NSCIDs as a "package" to the NSC (objective date: January 1958) for final approval.

MATTHEW C. STEWART
Colonel, USA

28 OCT

[redacted] CALLED. ATC. (IAC)

POSTPONED TO TUES, 5 NOV, 1957
MC

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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COMMENTS ON REVISED DRAFT OF NSCID NO. 5, DATED 23 DECEMBER 1957

1. a. Rewritten but no objection.b. No change.2. a. No change.b. No change.c. No change.(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. The new statement, in first sentence is, in net effect, unchanged except must the "all" be retained?

a. No change.b. No change.c. No change.d. Last sentence changed, but net effect the same.No OSD objection to
declassificationsubject to CIA

concurrency.

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4. Entire paragraph unchanged.

5. Entire paragraph unchanged.

6. Entire paragraph unchanged.

7. The latter portion of last sentence, contained in the 14 October draft, was eliminated, which said, ". . . which significantly affect the missions of such commanders." This placed a clear obligation upon the commander to inform the CIA representative of his missions and, in turn, upon the CIA representative to inform the commander of anything which affected the latter's mission--nothing more or less. OSD would like this statement retained.

8. a. Changed but appears good.

b. No change.

c. No change.

9. a. Changed but no objection.

b. Changed but no objection.

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1. a. Rewritten but no objection.

b. No change.

2. a. No change.

b. No change.

c. No change.

d. The statement, proposed by OSO, OSD, which was in the 14 October draft, "Arrangements involving the military services or any component of the Department of Defense, will be made in accordance with the procedures established by the Secretary of Defense," was eliminated. OSO liked it included - who decided to take it out? says will leave in if OSD wants.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. The new statement, in first sentence, is, in net effect, unchanged.

a. No change.

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- b. No change.
- c. No change
- d. Last sentence changed, but net effect the same.

- 4. Entire paragraph unchanged.
- 5. Entire paragraph unchanged.
- 6. Entire paragraph unchanged.

7. The latter portion of last sentence, contained in the 14 October draft, was eliminated, which said, "... which significantly affect the missions of such commanders." This placed a clear obligation upon the Commander to inform the CIA representative of his missions and, in turn, upon the CIA representative to inform the Commander of anything which affected the latter's mission--nothing more or less. OSD would like this statement retained.

- 8. a. Changed but appears good.
 - b. No change.
 - c. No change.
- 9. a. Changed but no objection.
 - b. Changed but no objection.

TOP SECRET

FROM: IAC		LOG NO. 8615	
FILE NO. TS		ATE 23 Dec 57	NO. OF CYS. 1
C. R.			
C. R.			
REFERRED	Col. Lansdale Col. Stewart		
ISSUE DATE	27 Dec SL		
DUE DATE	M		
SUBJECT:			
Revision of NSCID No. 5			
Please check this with Toldeela, and Gen. E SL			
RETURN RECEIPT		CONTROL REFERENCE	
FORM SD - 59			

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-105/5
23 December 1957
Revised Draft


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Revision of NSCID No. 5

1. The attached revision of NSCID No. 5 incorporates the majority of the suggestions proposed by General Schow and General Collins. As no other comments were received from the Intelligence Community, it is believed that NSCID No. 5 is now ready for IAC approval.

2. Accordingly, this paper will be on the Intelligence Advisory Committee agenda on 7 January 1957.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

Attachment as stated

Copy No. 44 T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

8615

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T.

IAC-D-105/5

Revision of 9 July Draft
9 December 1957

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

U. S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. For the purpose of this directive:

E. written
bd
a. Espionage is defined as that intelligence activity which is directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine operations against a foreign power.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information and installations abroad, against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

2. To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

Copy No __T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

a. Establish, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination;

b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions, including liaison which concerns clandestine activities or which involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad;

c. Invite departments and agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have clandestine counter-intelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration;

d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with other departments and agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency and coordinate the arrangements for cover support required by any other department or agency to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4. below, [except when such cover is to be provided unilaterally and without utilizing the facilities or becoming identified with other departments or agencies of the government or non-governmental organizations.] *new*

Copy No T.S. 164904

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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3. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility ^{new} [for all U. S. clandestine activities.] Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, it is responsible for the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all departments and agencies concerned, in connection with the national security;

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services;

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counter-intelligence information. All departments and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, [such material ^{new} collected by them as is appropriate for a central file.]

e. Upon request and to the extent practicable, assisting other departments and agencies in connection with their cover support needs.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U. S. and its possessions may:

a. Conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

b. Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;

c. Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the information collected. Departments and agencies shall provide similar support to each other as required.

6. In a foreign area, except where paragraph 8 applies, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State, insure that the senior U. S. representative, or his designated representative, is appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

7. In a foreign area where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders, or their designated representatives, appropriately informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence ^{new} activities and operations, conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from such areas, [including any liaison relationships between CIA and foreign military establishments.] ^{new}

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8. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

new
a. [Except as provided in sub-paragraph b. below,] the entire Central Intelligence Agency organization [conducting espionage and clandestine counterintelligence operations in or from a theater shall as a component force be under the direct command of the U. S. Theater Commander in accordance with agreements separately reached between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and] shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations. *new*

b. Espionage and counterintelligence operations which, because of some exceptional political, diplomatic or other implication, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency, shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U. S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other interested departments and agencies shall:

remit to { a. Develop appropriate policy recommendations for National Security Council consideration with respect to the overall U. S. counterintelligence effort conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions;

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revised

b. To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies approved by the National Security Council, provide for the coordination of all types of U. S. counterintelligence activities conducted abroad and for the coordination of such activities with those conducted by the departments and agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence.

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Copy No. T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

FROM: IAC		LOG NO. 8377	
FILE NO. TS # 141642	DATE 14Oct57	NO. OF CYS. #48 w/1	
C. R.		att	
C. R.			
REFERRED	Col Lansdale	Mr. Smith	Stewart
ISSUE DATE	18Oct57		17
DUE DATE			
SUBJECT:			
IAC-D-105/5 (Revised) Draft revision of NSCID No. 5			
RETURN RECEIPT			
FORM SD - 59		CONTROL REFERENCE	

FROM: IAC		LOG NO. 8377	
FILE NO. TS # 141642	DATE 14Oct57	NO. OF CYS. 48 w/1 att	
C. R.			
C. R.			
REFERRED	Col Lansdale Mr. Smith		
ISSUE DATE	18Oct57		
DUE DATE			
SUBJECT:			
IAC-D-105/5 (Revised) Draft revision of NSCID No. 5			
RETURN RECEIPT			
FORM SD - 59		CONTROL REFERENCE	

TS #141642
Copy No. 48
IAC-D-105/5 (Revised)
14 October 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Review of National Security Council Intelligence Directives

References: IAC-M-292, item 3; IAC-M-287, item 10

Attached is a draft revision of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, which has been coordinated by the interagency working group established by the IAC for this purpose. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC for discussion and appropriate preliminary action on 29 October 1957.



Secretary

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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TS #141642
IAC-D-105/5

Revision 9 July Draft
14 October 1957

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

U. S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. For the purpose of this directive:

a. Espionage is defined as ^{that intelligence} ~~those clandestine~~ activities which ^{is} ~~are~~ directed toward the acquisition of information through ^{clandestine} ~~intelli-~~ gence operations against a foreign power.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information and installations abroad, against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

2. To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

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a. Establish, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination;

b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions, including liaison which concerns clandestine activities or which involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad;

c. Invite Departments and Agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have clandestine counterintelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration;

d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinate arrangements for such cover support ^{required by any} as may be required by other Departments ^{or} and

Agencies to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in

paragraph 4 below, ^{except when such cover is to be provided} Arrangements for cover involving the ^{unilaterally & w/o utilizing the facilities or becoming identified} military services or any component of the Department of Defense

^{with other dept or agencies or non-governmental organizations.}

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will be made in accordance with the procedures established by the
Secretary of Defense.]

MAY GET TISSED OUT AS MORE APPROPRIATE
FOR A DISC/D

MUCH
MUMBLED
ABOUT THIS
STATEMENT

3. The Central Intelligence Agency *has primary responsibility for* ~~is the~~ national clandestine *all U.S. clandestine activities* service of the United States and has primary responsibility, subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, *it is responsible* ~~for~~ the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security;

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information to which all Departments and Agencies shall contribute on a continuing basis *such material collected by them is appropriate for a central file.* ~~all pertinent material collected by them~~

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other Departments and Agencies with commands or installations located outside the U. S. and its possessions may:

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- a. Conduct additional espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;
- b. Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;
- c. Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the information collected. They shall provide similar support to each other as required.

6. In a foreign area, except where paragraph 8 applies, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State, insure that the senior U. S. representative, or his designated representative, is appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

7. In ^{the} foreign areas where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders, or

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their designated representatives, appropriately informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence ^{activities and} operations, conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from such areas ^{including} which ^{any liaison relationship between CIA & foreign} significantly affect the missions of such commanders. ^{mid est. } get this in.}

8. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

Except as provided in sub para. b. below
 *a. ~~The entire Central Intelligence Agency organization assigned by the Director of Central Intelligence to a commander of a command established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be~~
conducting espionage & clandestine CI ops in or from -
Theatre shall as a component force be under the direct
command of the U.S. Theatre Commander in accordance with
agreements separately reached between the D.C.I. & the JCS, and
 shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations.

b. Espionage and counterintelligence operations which, because of some exceptional political, diplomatic or other implication, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency, shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State.

out [*Detailed arrangements concerning the command relationships between the CIA organization and the Armed Forces in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged are established by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U. S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other interested Departments and Agencies ^{out} [as provided in paragraph 2c above] shall:

a. *Develop appropriate policy recommendations*
 { Provide for coordination of all U. S. counterintelligence activities abroad and for the coordination of such activities with *for NSC consideration with respect to the overall U.S. counterintelligence effort conducted outside the* the Departments and Agencies responsible for domestic counter-*U.S. + its possessions.* intelligence, to the extent necessary to ensure conformity with

policies enunciated by the National Security Council;

b. *To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies approved by the NSC provide for the*
 { Take such other action as may be deemed necessary to promote the overall effectiveness of the U. S. counterintelligence *coordination of all types of U.S. counterintelligence effort abroad.* activities conducted abroad + for the coordination of such activities with those conducted by the Depts + Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence.

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TOP SECRET

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

27 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Ad Hoc Working Group on NSCID #5

SUBJECT : Revised Draft of NSCID #5

1. The enclosed draft of NSCID #5 is the result of informal coordination with and contributions from the working level within the intelligence community; it is believed that we have achieved general agreement on its basic provisions.

2. There is also general agreement among those agencies operationally involved with the subject that detailed instructions for implementation of this NSCID #5 should be spelled out in one or more DCIDs, as may be necessary, the primary objective of the NSCID being to set forth the basic assignment of authority and responsibilities.

3. It is requested that the members of the ad hoc working group meet on 9 October 1957 at 2:15 P.M. in the DCI Conference Room (214 Administration Building) for a final group discussion of the paper with the objective of expediting the transmission of a coordinated draft to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.


L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

Enclosure

T.S. #164742
Cy 3 of 50

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Revision 9 July Draft
24 September 1957NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

U. S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. For the purpose of this directive:

a. Espionage is defined as those clandestine activities which are directed toward the acquisition of information through intelligence operations against a foreign power.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information and installations abroad, against espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion. As an activity, counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T.S. #164741

Cy 3 of 50

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

2. To ensure centralized direction and prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

- a. Establish, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination;
- b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions, including liaison which concerns clandestine activities or which involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad;
- c. Invite Departments and Agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have clandestine counterintelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration;
- d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinate arrangements for such cover support as may be required by other Departments and Agencies to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4 below.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

3. As the national clandestine service of the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency shall have primary responsibility for the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security;

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information to which all Departments and Agencies shall contribute on a continuing basis all pertinent material collection by them.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other Departments and Agencies with commands or installations located outside the U. S. and its possessions may:

a. Conduct additional espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

b. Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

- 3 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

c. Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the information collected. They shall provide similar support to each other as required.

6. In a foreign area other than an active theater of war where U. S. forces are engaged, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. representative appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

7. In a foreign area where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders or their designated representatives, informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from the area which provide information of significant importance to the missions of such commanders.

8. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

*a. The entire Central Intelligence Agency organization assigned by the Director of Central Intelligence to a commander of a command established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be established as a CIA Force and, through the CIA Commander thereof, shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations.

b. Such exceptional espionage and counterintelligence operations which, because of delicate political or diplomatic implications, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U. S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other interested Departments and Agencies as provided in paragraph 2c above, shall:

* Detailed arrangements concerning the command relationships between the CIA organization and the Armed Forces in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged are established by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

a. Provide for adequate coordination of all U. S. counterintelligence activities abroad and for the coordination of such activities with the Departments and Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence, to the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies enunciated by the National Security Council;

b. Take such other action as may be deemed necessary to promote the overall effectiveness of the U. S. counterintelligence effort abroad.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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